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Decision verification in quality assurance is simply the Government's
determination of whether or not a contractor's inspection decisions are
correct. This paper discusses procedures for accomplishing decision
verification both as prescribed by directives and as actually done. It
examines reasons why decision verification does not appear to be a viable
element in current quality assurance programs even though this procedure
is still prescribed in Navy directives for use by contract administrators,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the shift in emphasis away from "hands-on" inspection
by the Government in quality assurance, effective methods of evaluating
the contractor's quality program have been sought by government agen-
cies responsible for contract administration. Decision verification is
one procedure which was developed to assist in assessing the effective-
ness of a contractor in controlling product quality.
Decision verification involves the Government's determination as to
whether contractor inspection decisions are correct or incorrect.
Statistical methods are then used to determine if the contractor's in-
spection process is effective under criteria established by the Govern-
ment.
Decision verification has been applied with varying degrees of in-
terest, enthusiasm, and success. Some of the Government agencies which
adopted these procedures in the 1960 's have since ceased to use them
because of real or perceived difficulties. In this paper we shall be
concerned with what the problems are, and how to overcome them so that
decision verification can be a useful means of judging the inspection
decision process of the contractor. The basic approach is to:
1. Discuss how decision verification should be accomplished if
done in accordance with guidance contained in Navy directives.
2. Discuss how decision verification was observed to be done at
selected activities, if it was done at all.
3. Show how the specified decision verification procedures were
developed, and suggest what could be done to improve the accomplishment
of decision verification.

As an initial step in research, applicable directives, reports,
and other documents dealing with decision verification were examined.
This provided a basic knowledge of how decision verification should
be done, at least in theory. Next, visits to several production
facilities and interviews with quality assurance personnel at these
facilities and in other Government offices provided information on how
decision verification really was done and the problems encountered in
doing it.
The plan of this paper is to compare the specified with the actual.
Early discussion centers on the quality assurance policy of the Depart-
ment of Defense, which caused procedures like decision verification to
be developed. Then the relationship of decision verification to other
quality assurance procedures in the overall Navy quality assurance pro-
gram is discussed. How various decision verification procedures differ
within the Navy is also highlighted. This is followed by a discussion
of the "real" world procedures or how decision verification is actually
done in the field. The final section of this paper contains conclu-
sions and recommendations.
Now, to set the scene, the next chapter discusses Department of
Defense quality assurance policy.

II. DECISION VERIFICATION IN POD
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS
Decision verification procedures are used to determine whether or
not a contractor's inspection decisions are correct or incorrect, and
with this information in hand, to assess the effectiveness of the con-
tractor's inspection process. This chapter deals with the application
of decision verification procedures by the Navy and other organizations
within the Department of Defense. The purpose of this chapter is to
tell why these procedures were developed, and where they fit into the
quality assurance programs of various organizations within the Depart-
ment of Defense. This chapter gives some reasons for the emphasis on
quality assurance by Government procurement organizations and discusses
DOD quality assurance policy. It outlines the basic elements of quality
assurance programs of two U. S. Navy organizations and highlights some
of the differences which exist in these programs.
A. IMPORTANCE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality assurance is an important part of systems procurement by
the Department of Defense. It is easy to cite at least three reasons
for this.
First, many of the current systems purchased by DOD are highly com-
plex. This is true not only for major systems such as aircraft and
ships, but also for smaller weapons systems. For example, the MK 56
sea mine requires 140 individual components for assembly of the completed
weapon. Effective quality assurance improves the probability that these
140 components will be assembled into a unit that will work as designed.

The second reason is closely allied to the first. Frequently,
many of the individual components needed for the complete system are
produced by different manufacturers using a variety of processes.
Many prime and sub-contractors produce items which must function
together in the end product. For example, over 125 different contrac-
tors are manufacturing hardware for the NASA Space Shuttle. These com-
ponents and subassemblies range from simple transformers to such
complex equipment as the Space Shuttle's main engines [Ref. 1] . Effec-
tive quality assurance is needed in order to minimize the problems
associated with assembling all of these different components into one
major vehicle.
A third reason for the emphasis on quality assurance is the avoid-
ance of financial waste associated with systems which fail to perform
as designed. A communications or intelligence satellite program,
which can cost well over $100 million, may waste substantial resources
in support equipment and facilities if the space vehicle does not
survive in orbit as long as intended.
B. DOD QUALITY ASSURANCE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY
The current DOD philosophy on quality assurance was initially de-
veloped in 1954 and formally expressed in DODINST 4155.6. This instruc-
tion made contractors responsible for assuring that material submitted
for acceptance to the Government did meet contract specifications and
requirements. The contractor had always been responsible for producing
material to the requirements of the contract, but prior to 1954 it had
been up to the Government to determine whether or not the material was
acceptable. Since acceptability was determined by inspection of the
material itself, a considerable amount of "hands-on" inspection by the
10

Government was necessary. Beginning in 1954 there was a redirection
of quality assurance emphasis away from product inspection and toward
the assessment of the contractor's quality assurance program. The
Department of Defense no longer performed the extensive product in-
spections which had formerly characterized its approach to quality
assurance. Instead, the contractor was now responsible for performing
many of the product inspections previously done by the Government
quality assurance representative [Ref . 2]
.
The basic DOD procurement quality assurance policy can be found in
Armed Services Procurement Regulations [Ref. 3] . This document sets
forth the quality assurance responsibilities of the Government and of
the contractor, and issues policy guidance for quality assurance rather
than detailed plans for establishing and operating an effective quality
program.
These regulations make it clear that the Government must determine
the quality requirements which are to be included in the contract.
This is usually done by contractual provisions dealing with performance
specifications, product specifications, standard inspection clauses,
and other quality assurance related specifications such as MIL-Q-9858A,
Quality Assurance Program Requirements .
The contractor is assigned responsibility for controlling the
,
quality of his product and for assuring that only contractually conform-
ing items are delivered to the Government. He must also maintain, and
furnish to the Government if requested, objective evidence that he is
fulfilling his quality responsibilities.
Armed Services Procurement Regulations do not prescribe specific
quality-assurance measures. In accordance with these regulations:
11

It is the contract administration office responsibility to
develop and apply effective and efficient procedures for
Government procurement quality assurance.
The regulations list a number of possible quality assurance procedures
from which the responsible contract administration office may choose
for administering the quality requirements of a given contract. These
options include, but are not limited to the following:
1. Physical inspection of the contract item.
2. Evaluation and approval or disapproval of the contractor's
system for controlling quality.
3. Use of information from consumers to uncover deficiencies.
Now that Defense Department quality assurance policy has been out-
lined, we will discuss some of the organizations that carry out that
policy, with particular emphasis on organizations that administer Navy
contracts
.
Navy contracts are administered by one of several sources. Some
of these contracts are administered by the office of a Naval Plant
Representative which is located at the contractor's plant. Others are
administered by the office of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conver-
sion, and Repair located at each Naval District headquarters. Navy con-
tracts for material which is being produced in plants under the primary
cognizance of another Service such as the Air Force are normally
administered by that Service. The Defense Contract Administration
Service often administers contracts for military material production
in plants where no Service personnel are assigned.
~1J. S. Department of Defense, Armed Services Procurement Regulations
,
(Washington: 1 July 1976), p. 14:8.
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It is interesting to note that Defense Department agencies includ-
ing the Navy are sometimes tasked to administer contracts for other
Government organizations outside of the Department of Defense. For ex-
ample, the Defense Contract Administration Service has been delegated
to act for NASA on some Space Shuttle contracts. NASA does not prescribe
all of the detailed quality assurance actions which the delegated agency
should take. The Defense Contract Administration Service must use its
existing procedures as well as any guidance or special instructions which
NASA provides [Ref . 4]
.
C. SOME DIFFERENCES IN QUALITY ASSURANCE
PROGRAMS OF VARIOUS AGENCIES
It has been pointed out that Navy contracts are sometimes adminis-
tered by other agencies, and that in turn the Navy may be called upon
to administer other than Navy contracts. Since the contract administra-
tion activity generally uses its own quality assurance procedures on
all contracts that it administers, it is important to note some of the
differences that exist between the quality assurance programs of the
various DOD agencies.
Requirements for DOD quality assurance programs are contained in
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200.1 of August 1976 which is entitled,
Procurement Quality Assurance [Ref. 5] . Although this is a Joint Ser-
vice directive and was co-signed by representatives of each military
Service, the Navy has not yet chosen to abide by this manual without
issuing its own supplemental instructions.
In connection with this discussion of decision verification, it is
interesting to note that one of the predecessors of the present manual
was issued in 1969. This directive, commonly referred to as Handbook
13

57, contained a decision verification procedure called "Contractor
Decision Verification" [Ref . 6] . The requirement to accomplish Contrac-
tor Decision Verification was cancelled in 1973 when Handbook 57 was
superseded by an early version of Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200.1 .
Consequently, the Defense Contract Administration Service, which organi-
zationally is part of the Defense Supply Agency, no longer uses
Contractor Decision Verification procedures in administering contracts.
Thus we see that a very important part of the DOD contract administra-
tion organization omits decision verification as an element in quality
assurance.
Unlike the Defense Contract Administration Service, the Navy has
not eliminated decision verification from its repertory of quality-
assurance procedures. At least two organizations within the Navy
material headquarters have issued quality assurance instructions con-
taining decision verification procedures to be used by their field
contract-administration offices
.
The Naval Air Systems Command is one of the two organizations.
It exercises control over contract administration of production in
some contractors' plants through the office of a Naval Plant Represen-
tative or NAVPRO who is physically located at the production facility.
He is responsible for developing and applying effective and efficient
quality assurance plans and procedures which are consistent with
requirements of the particular contracts which he administers.
The basic elements of the quality assurance program for use by
contract-administration field activities which are under the cognizance
of the Naval Air Systems Command are as follows:
14

1. Planning . The NAVPRO initiates planning as soon as the con-
tract document is received. Planning includes the selection of the
applicable elements which are compatible with local production condi-
tions.
2. Procedures Review . A review is conducted to confirm that the
contractor's quality procedures are complete and comprehensive in
scope.
3. Procedures Evaluation . A continuing assessment is made of the
contractor's procedures to confirm that his procedures are adequate
to assure the quality of the products or services delivered to the
Government, and that the contractor is actually following these pro-
cedures .
4. Product Verification . The actual product item is examined,
tested, and inspected to determine whether or not the item conforms
to the contract's requirements.
5. Contractor Decision Verification . Decision verification pro-
cedures are a primary topic of this thesis. Contractor Decision
Verification is defined as "A random and continuing evaluation of the
contractor's decisions, performed by comparing the findings of Govern-
2
ment inspection with contractor's inspection records." It will be
applied whenever "in-process product control is performed by. the con-
tractor and the volume of production and duration of contracts is
stable." 3
2
Naval Air Systems Command, NAVAIR FIELD CONTRACT MANUAL , NAVAIRINST







6. Quality Data Evaluation . A periodic evaluation of all accumu-
lated quality data is made for the specific contract being administered.
This data includes such items as contractor inspection records, pro-
cedures review information, and user feedback on the quality of the
product. It is used for a number of purposes including adjustment of
the intensity of Government inspection.
7. Corrective Action . Corrective action is the action that the
Government requires the contractor to take in order to correct defi-
ciencies in the product delivered to the Government [Ref. 7],
Thus we see that Contractor Decision Verification is one of
several quality assurance techniques which the NAVPRO can use in his
quality assurance program.
Another Navy organization which still retains decision verifi-
cation procedures as part of its quality assurance program is the Naval
Sea Systems Command. This command has issued two manuals. One is
applicable to ship acquisition contracts, and the other manual applies
to ship repair contracts [Refs . 8,9].
The quality program for ship acquisition is similar to that for
ship repair contracts, but there are significant differences between
the two. For example, the basic elements which constitute the procure-
ment quality assurance program for ship repair contracts are also
applicable to the quality assurance program for ship acquisition con-
tracts, but an additional element is included in the latter. The
following is a list of the basic elements of both the ship acquisition
quality program and the ship repair contract quality program. Elements









4. Verification of Contractor's Records . This procedure is in-
cluded in the quality assurance program for ship acquisition but not
for ship repair. It is a decision verification procedure similar to
Contractor Decision Verification procedures previously mentioned in
the discussion about quality programs of the Naval Air Systems Command.
5. Procedures Evaluation"
6. Corrective Action"
7. Quality Data Evaluation"
From this listing we see that verification of contractor's records
is an element of quality assurance programs for ship acquisition, but
not for ship repair contracts. It should be pointed out here that a
much stronger emphasis on the independence between Government quality-
assurance functions and contractor quality functions is found in the
quality assurance instructions for ship repair contracts, than one can
find in the quality assurance directives for ship acquisition. The
following quotation which refers to ship repair contracts illustrates
this.
SUPSHIP quality assurance personnel shall not serve as an
adjunct to, or a replacement for the contractor's own inspection
system. For example, the SUPSHIP office should not serve as a
convenient means of advising the contractor of obvious deficiencies
in work performance; nor should it be used by the contractor as a
progressive inspection device to determine whether or not the end
product will be acceptable. 14
4Naval Sea Systems Command, Ship Repair Contracting Manual
,
NAVSEA 0900-LP-079-5010 (Washington: 1974), p. 1202.
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Besides differences of philosophy within the Naval Air Systems Com-
mand, there are some specific differences concerning decision verifica-
tion procedures between the Naval Air Systems Command and the Naval Sea
Systems Command. For example, verification should be accomplished by
Naval Air Systems Command contract administration activities, but is
optional for Naval Sea Systems Command contract administration activities,
This chapter has shown that decision verification procedures are
still an element of some agencies' quality assurance programs. This
along with the fact that various agencies have somewhat different
quality assurance -programs are the two most important points to be
gleaned from this chapter. The next chapter will discuss the concept
and objectives of decision verification in a quality assurance program.
It will also describe specific procedures used by two Navy organizations






This chapter discusses the concept of decision verification and
the reasons for applying decision verification procedures in the ad-
ministration of Navy contracts, in order to show why these procedures
are used and how they are applied. To do this, the initial discus-
sion will focus on instances where decision verification can be used
advantageously. The discussion will then shift to a narrative descrip-
tion of how decision verification is to be accomplished when it is
done in accordance with Navy directives.
A. THE NEED FOR DECISION VERIFICATION
In many procurements, there are circumstances in which the examina-
tion of the end product alone cannot be used to ascertain whether or
not the item is acceptable and meets contractual requirements. When
large numbers of identical items such as gun projectiles are manufac-
tured, it may be too costly to inspect each item. When expensive
items are subject to destructive testing, it may be uneconomical even
to test large samples of the end item. An aircraft contains large
numbers of electrical cable runs, some of which are inaccessible for
normal inspection once the aircraft has been assembled. This wiring
must be installed in accordance with specifications, but it may not be
feasible to perform 100% product inspection on every run of wiring.
Since extensive product inspection is often impractical, it
appeared highly desirable to the authors of DOD quality assurance
programs that the Government be able to determine that the contractor's
19

in-process operations are producing product which is within acceptable
quality limits. They assumed that if the contractor has an effective
quality assurance program, his product would meet contractual standards
most of the time. The contractor's inspection process is one important
part of his quality assurance program [6 ] . Therefore it is important
to know how well this process is working.
One element of inspection is the actual decision of the inspector
concerning whether or not a certain attribute or characteristic meets
contractual requirements. Measuring the effectiveness of a contractor's
program by an examination of these decisions will be the subject of the
next section of this chapter.
B. THE CONCEPT OF DECISION VERIFICATION
Decision verification procedures originated from a concept developed
by the Air Force in the late 1950's. By 1969 these procedures had been
adopted by the Defense Supply Agency and included in its directives on
quality assurance.
Under the concept of decision verification, the Government quality
assurance representative "inspects" the decision made by the contractor's
inspector. He then determines whether the contractor's inspector made
a good or a bad decision. The contractor's inspector can make one of
two basic -errors which result in a wrong decision. The inspector can
fail to report a real defect,or he can report a false defect. The former
happens when the inspector fails to see a defect, or if he does see it,
fails to note it as a defect through an error in judgment. A false
detection is solely an error in the inspector's judgment. Therefore,
the QA representative can check on the decision of the inspector using
both material which is accepted by the contractor's inspector and




The effectiveness of the contractor's inspection decisions can be
described as a process average representing the percent of decisions
that are incorrect because of either type of error. Typically, direc-
tives specify an acceptable quality level (AQL) of 1% for the con-
tractor's decision process, which means that the Government expects
that the contractor's inspector will make the correct decision at
least 99% of the time [6]
.
It is easy to see why the AQL had to be greater than zero, for
seldom does an inspector always make correct decisions. Apparently the
1% AQL was chosen after evaluating the quality performance of a large
number of contractors of various sizes producing various products.
Useful information as to why an AQL of 1% was selected can be found
in a 1969 Defense Contract Administration Service lesson plan for Con-
tractor Decision Verification procedures training [Ref . 11] . Accord-
ing to this lesson plan, experience indicates that 95 percent of the
contractors will operate with 0% to 1% process average as related to
Contractor Decision Verification.
Decision verification was developed primarily to assure that the
contractor's quality program or inspection system satisfactorily con-
trols the quality of the product. This statement has occasionally
been interpreted incorrectly to mean that if the contractor's decision
process is within acceptable limits (1%) no quality defects should be
found in the end product. In March 1971, the report of a Joint Service
Panel on Contract Administration strongly questioned the value of
decision verification. The report said:
In actual practice, rarely does a contractor's percent defec-
tiveness exceed the process average limits. As a consequence, in
some cases when product quality deficiencies have been encountered
21

during product verification, the contractor's decision making
process is considered acceptable because it has not exceeded the
process average limits. For this reason the value of CDV as
currently applied is questioned.
^
Overlooked here is the fact that if the contractor's inspection
system is inadequate, his inspectors could still make predominantly
good decisions and the end product could still be unsatisfactory.
Decision verification procedures used by DOD really evaluate the
effectiveness of the implementation of whatever inspection system
the contractor has installed. These procedures do not alone evaluate
the adequacy of that inspection system, but can be used with other
methods to do so.
C. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
DECISION VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
Contract administration offices under the Naval Air Systems Com-
mand have been directed to use a procedure called Contractor Decision
Verification in programs for evaluating a contractor's quality per-
formance [7], Contractor Decision Verification is defined as a
"system performed by the Government to determine how well or the
accuracy at which the contractor's overall inspection operation is
functioning." This is accomplished by evaluating the accuracy of
randomly selected contractor's inspection decisions on specific or
general product quality characteristics. The number and type of
characteristics to be observed by the Government quality-assurance
representative in evaluating the contractor's program, depend on the
5
U. S. Department of Defense, Report of the Joint AMC/NMC/AFLC/AFSC
Panel on Contract Administration (Washington: 24 Mar 1971), p. 41.
c
Naval Air Systems Command, Navair Field Contract Administration
Manual NAVATRINST 4330.16 (Washington: Nov 71), p. 4-105.
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particular process and product being inspected. Random selection is
done by use of a random number table.
Before actually carrying out verification procedures, the Government
quality assurance representative groups the contractor's inspection
activities into manageable units, and determines points in the produc-
tion flow process at which the contractor's inspection decisions should
be verified. These are called verification stations. Verification
stations should be chosen to provide an equal chance for all important
contractor inspection decisions to be verified while simultaneously re-
ducing the possibility of undue concentration on some particular process,
product, or individual inspector. Once the total number of verification
stations necessary for evaluating the contractor's decision process has
been determined, they are grouped into Product Control Centers contain-
ing from three to nine stations each.
Establishing verification stations and Product Control Centers and
determining which product characteristics will be used are NAVPRO func-
tions. The actual procedures to be followed in accomplishing Contractor
Decision Verification are:
1. Select one-half, but not less than three, verification stations
within each PCC using a table of random numbers. Any station or sta-
tions which have not been verified within three consecutive verification
cycles are automatically included in the next succeeding cycle.
2. After selecting verification stations, the QA representative
verifies that the procedures used by the contractor in product process-
ing in each Product Control Center conform to contract specifications.
Any defect noted counts as one defective observation.
3. The next step is to take 50 observations per day from each Prod-
uct Control Center until a total of 250 observations have been
23

accumulated there. If there are seven or fewer defective decisions in
this sample of 250 observations, the contractor's decision process is
considered to be under control at that center. The critical value of
seven is based on three sigma limits. If the contractor's process is
under control, the quality assurance representative shifts to less fre-
quent sampling as discussed below.
4. If the contractor's decision process is under control, the
quality-assurance representative takes 50 observations from each PCC
within each subsequent interval of 11 calendar days. (For each 11-day
interval a new random selection of verification stations is made to
begin the new cycle.) At this sampling frequency, the process is con-
sidered to be under control as long as the percent defective in a
sample of size 50 is 5.2% or less. If the percent defective exceeds
5.2% for 50 observations, an additional 50 observations are taken at
the same verification stations within two days. If the percent defec-
tive of the total 100 decisions examined exceeds 4-. 2%, the QA repre-
sentative reverts to taking 50 observations per day for five days until
the contractor has taken effective corrective action and the process is
again under control [7]. It should be noted here, that these pro-
cedures contain no provisions for using samples of less than 50 obser-
vations
.
Thus we see that Contractor Decision Verification procedures involve
an initial step of taking 50 observations per day until 250 have been
accumulated. Then if the process is considered under control, based
on criteria set forth in applicable directives, the quality assurance
representative is allowed to use a smaller sample at greater intervals
of time as long as the process remains under control. If at any time
24

during this reduced sampling period, the process appears out of control
the quality assurance representative has prescribed procedures to fol-
low to insure that adequate sampling is done to confirm whether or not
the process is in fact out of control.
D. NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND DECISION
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
The decision verification procedures used by Naval Sea Systems Com-
mand activities are called Verification of Contractor Records [8]
.
They are analogous to Contractor Decision Verification procedures used
by the Naval Air Systems Command.
The Naval Sea Systems Command seems to be more flexible in the
application of decision verification procedures than other organiza-
tions. It gives the individual contract administration office con-
siderable discretion in deciding whether or not to use decision veri-
fication in administering the quality assurance program associated
with any particular contract. One important procedural difference
between the accomplishment of Verification of Contractor Records and
Contractor Decision Verification should be emphasized. For verifica-
tion purposes the nominal sample size specified by Naval Air Systems
Command directives is 50 observations. Naval Sea Systems Command
directives allow the local quality representative to select the nominal
sample size. The effect of this coupled with the use of a constant
percent defective as the basis for rejecting the contractor's process
will be more fully explored in later sections of this paper.
The selection of stations for verification and their grouping into
control centers is essentially the same as done for Contractor Decision
Verification. The number of verification stations in each control
center is three to nine.
25

The following describes the procedures for accomplishing Verifica-
tion of Contractor Records:
1. Just as is done in Contractor Decision Verification, one-half
but not less than three, verification stations from each control center
are selected at random using a table of random numbers. Any station
or stations which have not been verified within three consecutive veri-
fication cycles are automatically included in the next succeeding
cycle.
2. Also as is done in Contractor Decision Verification, one pro-
cedural observation will be made for each type of product inspected
and included in the sample of observations of the applicable control
center.
3. From this point in the procedures, the differences between
Verification of Contractor Records and Contractor Decision Verification
become significant. Instead of a specified sample of 50 observations
per day from each control center, the quality assurance representative
following decision verification instructions of the Naval Sea Systems
Command determines locally the size of the daily sample to be taken in
each control center. When five samples of this established size have
been accumulated, the contractor's process is accepted as under control,
at that center if the percent defectives in the total number of obser-
vations in the five groups is 2.8% or less.
4. If at this point the contractor's process is in control, the
quality assurance representative reduces the frequency of sampling.
He takes one sample of the locally established size within each seven-
day interval. When the percent defective of this sample exceeds 2.8%
regardless of the sample size, the quality assurance representative
26

reverts to sampling as specified in the preceding paragraph, until cor-
rective action has been taken by the contractor and the decision process
has been brought under control at the 1% AQL [8]
.
Before proceeding to the next topic it is important to emphasize
that the allowable percent defective under Verification of Contractor
Records procedures is a constant 2.8% regardless of the size of the
sample, while for Contractor Decision Verification the limiting percent
defective varies with the size of the sample. This will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter V.
E. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN EFFECTIVE
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE
The importance of quality assurance has already been discussed in
Chapter II. The quality assurance functions of DOD agencies currently
consume a large portion of contract administration resources, much of
which is spent on product inspection. Over 9,000 people, 34 percent of
contract administration personnel in DOD, are assigned quality assurance
responsibilities. A recent study of DOD contract administration noted
that the Government was unnecessarily duplicating quality-assurance
actions of the contractor. Too much effort was being expended on prod-
uct inspection. For example, in one geographical region studied,
quality assurance personnel spent 46% of their time doing product inspec-
tion and only 22% of their time doing surveillance of the contractor's
quality assurance program [Ref . 12]
.
Decision verification procedures originated from the requirement to
reduce the need for doing product inspection. They were developed as
surveillance methods to aid in determining the effectivenss of the con-
tractor's quality program. It has been estimated that halving the
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current production inspection effort, even if the man-years of effort
in surveillance were doubled, would still result in a 15 to 20 percent
savings in personnel cost of approximately $15 million annually [12]
.
From the above discussion, it seems that any workable surveillance
method has merit. That is why Contractor Decision Verification pro-
cedures and other similar procedures were developed. This chapter has
shown how these procedures should be accomplished. The following






The decision verification procedures described by the Naval Air
Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems Command were discussed in the
previous chapter, and we now turn our attention to the current appli-
cation of these procedures where they are employed. (Some contract
administration offices do not use the decision verification procedures
which are specified in the directives of the various Naval Systems
Commands.) The purpose of this chapter is to show the diversity which
exists in the application of decision verification at several field
activities
.
The chapter opens with a description of some of the facilities
which were visited to gather information on decision verification pro-
cedures. Then we will describe how these procedures are done at these
facilities, and relate some views about decision verification as
expressed by the personnel who must use this quality assurance method.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITIES VISITED
Several contract administration offices were visited to obtain
first-hand information on how decision verification procedures were
applied as part of on-going quality control programs. We shall refer
to the activities visited as Facilities A, B, and C.
Facility A is located at a large manufacturing plant now engaged
in producing combat jet aircraft for the Navy as well as for foreign
countries. This is the only military aircraft being produced at this
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plant. Although this particular aircraft has been produced by this com-
pany for many years, production was at a relatively low level at the
time of the visit. Commercial products and aircraft are also produced
at the same plant. A resident Naval Plant Representative administers
Navy contracts at Facility A.
Facility B is also at a large plant engaged in producing Naval air-
craft. Both jet and non-jet aircraft are produced for the Navy and
for foreign countries, and a resident Naval Plant Representative admin-
isters contracts at this plant.
Facility C is the office of a Naval District Supervisor of Ship-
building, Conversion and Repair. The quality assurance personnel
assigned have responsibilities at several large and small shipyards, in-
cluding a major yard now constructing two large auxiliary ships for the
United States Navy. This yard will soon begin building a number of
small combatants. The various production sites for which this office
is responsible include some involved in one-of-a-kind experimental
model production.
Other activities visited or contacted by phone included additional
Naval District SUPSHIP offices, and a plant where NASA contracts are
administered by the Defense Contract Administration Service.
B. FINDINGS AT FACILITY A
The visit to Facility A included interviews with the Naval Plant
Representative and Government quality assurance personnel.
The Naval Plant Representative expressed the view that the real
objective of the Navy quality assurance organization was not to empha-
size product inspection, but rather to insure the effectiveness of the
contractor's quality program. He was quite aware of Contractor Decision
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Verification, but he indicated that the procedures as specified by
Naval Air Systems Command directive, were difficult to follow at this
plant because of the nature of production. Because of this, he had
been and was interested in determining two things related to Contractor
Decision Verification. Since he was often unable to acquire the
required sample size, he wanted to know how many contractor's inspec-
tion decisions must be observed in order to obtain useful results. He
also wanted to know whether or not all of the inspection decisions
verified should be decisions on military hardware since the directive
does not specify this.
Government quality assurance personnel with whom Contractor Deci-
sion Verification procedures were discussed generally accepted them
as reasonable, but thought them excessively complex. They indicated
that it was difficult to use the procedures under certain production
conditions such as low volume. Another important point which emerged
from interviews here, and again in conversations with experienced
supervisors at other facilities, was that successful use of these pro-
cedures depended largely upon the motivation and competence of Govern-
ment quality assurance personnel. Concern was expressed that some
personnel might not follow decision verification procedures correctly
in order to avoid personal conflict with contractor personnel. Such
a situation could arise particularly in cases of close association
between the QA representative and the contractor's inspector. It
appeared that conducting product inspection was much easier from a
human relations standpoint than passing judgment on the competence of




The Naval Plant Representative at Facility A has had his quality-
assurance people study the application of Contractor Decision Verifi-
cation procedures as an element of his quality assurance program. He
then directed his people in attempting to implement Contractor Decision
Verification as prescribed in Naval Air Systems Command directives.
They then studied the results to uncover problems.
In doing this trial, the quality assurance representative randomly
selected at least three verification stations from each Product Control
Center. He then went to those stations to inspect military hardware
which might be available there. He frequently found that no military
hardware was ready for inspection, or at least not enough of it to make
the required 50 observations per day in the control center.
Auditing verification also presents problems. In actual practice,
results of any observations that are made are to be recorded on
DD Form 1711 in accordance with prescribed procedures. The characteris-
tics inspected are not identified on this form. Instead, the verifica-
tion station is noted on the form together with the number of observa-
tions made at each station. This makes it difficult to audit results
in terms of actual hardware inspected unless a defect is noted, and
corrective action for that specific hardware deficiency is initiated.
Facility A currently does not perform decision verification pro-
cedures in the manner prescribed by directives because the requirement
for decision verification can be waived if the volume of production is
insufficient to support its accomplishment. Locally prepared quality
assurance directives, Quality Division Operating Procedures , state that
"statistical" methods of accomplishing decision verification have proven
unworkable, but recognize the concept of decision verification as a
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reasonable and important part of procurement quality assurance. Conse-
quently, modified decision verification procedures have been developed
for use at Facility A. Under the previously mentioned local directives,
the quality assurance representative evaluates the correctness of the
contractor's acceptance decision by verifying one or more products in
each Product Control Center. The section supervisor determines when the
total number of verifications is adequate in each case.
By way of review for a moment, recall that the purpose of decision
verification is to determine the effectiveness of the contractor's in-
spection decisions, and that this effectiveness can be expressed as a
process average in terms of the percent of decisions that are defective.
The contractor's decision process average is compared with an established
percent defective allowable limit. If the process average exceeds this
limit, we say that the contractor's inspection decision process is out
of control, and the contractor will be directed to take corrective action
to bring his process under control.
Returning now to the discussion of Facility A, it is emphasized that
decision verification procedures have not been used at Facility A to
develop a process average for use in controlling the contractor's decision
inspection process; rather the results of inspections are related to
product quality. Requests to the contractor for corrective action have
apparently been based on the discovery of individual material defects
during inspection rather than on a determination that the contractor's
inspection decision process is out of control. If this is the case, it
supports the findings of the Joint Service Panel on Contract Administra-
tion, whose report of March 1971 said:
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Further, it appears to the Panel, that as constituted, the CDV
procedures serve only to assure the correction of specific defi-
ciencies detected solely on a random basis. Thus, if a QAR in
performing 50 random observations' detects a particular product
or process deficiency, he may direct corrective action to the
particular deficiency which he encountered. The QAR therefore has
little way of knowing that other characteristics have turned de-
defective until this point turns up in a later inspection.
All of this seems to add up to the fact that Contractor Decision Verifi-
cation Procedures are being used as a product inspection technique
rather than as a method of controlling the contractor's decision process,
C. FINDINGS AT FACILITY B
The visit to Facility B included interviews with Government QA per-
sonnel but not the Naval Plant Representative.
Personnel with whom decision verification was discussed appeared to
be enthusiastic about this concept as a quality assurance tool, but it
was soon determined that Contractor Decision Verification was not done
continually at Facility B. It is done only during periodic quality-
assurance audits. This appears primarily to result from a lack of
sufficient personnel to accomplish decision verification continuously
at Hhe nine control centers which have been established.
Quality assurance audits are undertaken on an as needed basis such
as when quality data indicates an adverse quality trend developing or
on a 180 day cycle. During the audit, one quality assurance representa-
tive works full time on decision verification.
Like Facility A, the contractor at Facility B also has commercial
production in progress along with military production in the same
general location. When Decision Verification is done during quality
assurance audits, only military hardward is used if enough of it is
7




available. Quality assurance personnel attempt to stay away from any
location which is primarily commercial production. If an item of com-
mercial hardware does happen to come through a predominantly military
product station, and no military material is available for inspection,
the Quality Assurance Representative is permitted to use the commer-
cial product for decision verification purposes.
D. FINDINGS AT FACILITY C
Facility C is a Naval District Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conver-
sion and Repair office, operating under the direction of the Naval Sea
Systems Command. The field visit to Facility C was somewhat limited
in scope, but interviews with QA supervisory personnel were conducted.
Quality assurance management personnel at Facility C are familiar
with the decision verification procedure prescribed by the Naval Sea
Systems Command. Recall that this procedure is called Verification of
Contractor Records, and that the Naval Sea Systems Command makes the
inclusion of this procedure in any quality assurance program optional.
At Facility C the quality assurance personnel have elected not to use
decision verification, although their internal directives contain com-
prehensive instructions dealing with the accomplishment of Verification
of Contractor Records.
Construction of two large auxiliary ships for the Navy in a
civilian yard is one of the major production activities now under the
cognizance of this office. This construction provides an opportunity
for application of decision verification procedures. At the highest
level of construction activity, 16 quality assurance people will be
assigned directly to the project office with additional people available
as needed from the Naval District SUPSHIP office. The management plan
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for these ships specifies quality assurance tasks to be performed.
These tasks include review and evaluation of contractor's procedures
and processes, and product verification of hardware, but decision
verification is not included.
Facility C personnel gave two reasons for not using Verification
of Contractor Records procedures . First , the type of operations in-
volved in ship construction make it difficult to establish control
centers and verification stations. There often is not enough hardware
at a given station to permit the required number of observations.
Second, the geographical distribution of activities in a shipyard
makes it difficult for Government representatives to be present at
any given time when contractor-inspected material is available to
be used for decision verification. The shortage of personnel exists
at other facilities as well. There are just not enough personnel to
adequately carry out decision verification procedures.
E. NASA AND DECISION VERIFICATION
The final field visit was to a contractor's plant in which a NASA
Space Shuttle is being built. At this plant, the Defense Contract
Administration Service exercises the contract administration function
under a letter of delegation from NASA. According to NASA directives,
the delegated agency is to use its own administrative, operational,
and procedural instructions, and technical documents plus any addi-
tional direction which NASA provides. If the agency instructions con-
flict with NASA directives, the latter prevail [4]
.
For inspection purposes there are two important categories of
characteristics mentioned in NASA contracts. These are "mandatory"
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and "other than mandatory". A mandatory characteristic is one, which
if defective, could prevent the article from performing its intended
purpose in the next higher assembly or result in hazardous or unsafe
conditions. "Other than mandatory" characteristics are those selected
for inspection and test "as necessary to prevent degradation of
quality" [M-] . Each mandatory characteristic is subject to inspection
or test on every article of product. "Other than mandatory"
characteristics may be inspected by sampling when appropriate.
At the plant visited, the contract is administered by the Defense
Contract Administration Service which has long since discontinued use
of decision verification. However, NASA contracts could also be
administered by Navy offices which still include decision verification
procedures as an element in quality assurance. NASA's policy on this
is:
The use of "Contractor Decision Verification (CDV)" or similar
systems as a substitute for "mandatory" or "other than mandatory"
inspection of an article is prohibited.
Contractor Decision Verification (CDV) or any similar system
is not to be substituted for this requirement nor is it to be
used for product inspection or article acceptance
.
NASA policy as stated in the foregoing quotations has been inter-
preted by some people to mean that CDV or similar procedures will not
be used in administration of NASA contracts.
Obviously the four activities contacted are only a limited sample
of the total. Nevertheless they are representative of the variety
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Quality Assurance
Provisions for Government Agencies
,




of production activity under various contract administration offices.
This chapter has shown that at least seme activities decision veri-
fication is not used. The following chapter will discuss these veri-
fication procedures from the manager's aspect.
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V. SOME COMMENTS FOR CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS
ON USING DECISION VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
Previous chapters have discussed specified procedures for determin-
ing whether or not a contractor's inspection decision process is oper-
ating within Government established limits. This chapter discusses
some ways a Government contract administrator might locally modify the
specified procedures in order to make them more useful in situations
where there is too little production volume to feasibly obtain the
specified number of sample observations. Operating characteristic
curves are presented to show how variables such as sample size, fre-
quency of sampling, and actual process fraction defective affect the
usefulness of decision verification. Also discussed are some human
factors which impact on the operation of decision verification.
A. SAMPLING AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONTROL
CHARTS FOR VERIFICATION
Since 100 percent inspection of each item is often not practical or
not considered cost effective, Navy quality assurance personnel use
sampling techniques in performing decision verification. When sampling
is done, there is always a risk that unsatisfactory inspection decision
performance will be accepted by the Government. This risk arises from
the fact that the sample may not be representative of the process quality
and from errors in inspection of decisions from the sample.
In practice, not even 100% inspection always insures a defect free
product or process. Experiments with 100% inspection indicate that the
average number of defects detected may be considerably less than 100%
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of the defects present. An experiment which was done to determine the
influence of complexity on inspection errors resulted in defect detec-
tions of from 30% for complex items to 80% for less complex items [10]
.
This of course refers to individual inspectors rather than to the con-
tractor's inspection process as a whole. The contractor's process
would be expected to have a higher effectiveness because of repetitive
inspections and other controls on quality.
Since 100% inspection may not guarantee that all defective decisions
will be discovered, the manager should realize that sampling is even
less likely to uncover all errors. It follows that since decision veri-
fication uses sampling j we should expect that not all incorrect decisions
of a contractor will be discovered.
Although the two verification methods discussed in this paper use
sampling, there are important differences between them. One method is
based on using a control chart approach to determine when the contractor's
... 9decision process is out of control. The other method appears simply to
sample the inspection decisions, and then accept or reject the contrac-
tor's inspection process by comparing the percent defective in the
sample with 2.8%.
Contractor Decision Verification procedures are based on the concept
of a control chart called a "p-chart" which is designed to determine
whether or not the process is under control. The p-chart shows variation
9 ...
The control chart is a useful device for determining whether ob-
served changes are due simply to chance fluctuations or to actual
changes in the process because of sucn things as deterioration of
machine parts, or in this case to mistakes by the inspector. A com-
prehensive discussion of control charts can be found in Quality Control




around a central value of the fraction defective in the output of a
process. In this case it shows variations in the fraction defective
of inspection decisions.
Under the assumption that most contractor's inspection decision
processes are accurate 99% of the time, the Government has established
an Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) of 1% for contractor inspection
decisions [11] . This AQL value is used as the central line of the
p-charts for each Product Control Center when Contractor Decision Veri-
fication is applied as an element of a quality assurance program [7]
.
The Upper Control Limit (UCL) for the chart is set at three standard
deviations, above the AQL, or the so-called "three-sigma limit". The
use of a three-sigma limit significantly reduces the probability that
any given sample result which falls outside this limit does so by
chance alone if the process is under control.
In order to illustrate how the p-chart could be prepared using Navy
procedures for Contractor Decision Verification, we consider the
initial step in verification of taking 50 observations for five days
to get a total of 250 observations. The central line fraction defective
p' is the AQL value of 0.01. In the example, the three-sigma limit can
be computed as follows:







The Upper Control Limit for this p-chart is equal to the central
line value of 0.01 plus the value of three-sigma, and thus the Upper
Control Limit in this case is 0.028. The acceptance number for the
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sample of 250 is obtained by multiplying the sample size by the value
of the Upper Control Limit. The acceptance number for the example is
7. Thus if 7 or fewer defective decisions are found in a sample of
250, the contractor's inspection decision making process is considered
to be under control.
Continuing with this example, if the process is under control after
the initial sample, only 50 observations are required each 11 day
interval thereafter as long as the process remains under control [7] .
The p-chart for the 50 observations is similar to the previous chart.
The central line is at 0.01, but the control limit is different. Since
the standard deviation varies inversely with the square root of the
sample size, the Upper Control Limit gets further away from the central
line value as the sample size is decreased. In this case the Upper
Control Limit is now 0.052. Based on this upper limit, the process is
considered under control unless there are more than three defectives
in a sample of 50 observations.
Contractor Decision Verification procedures and Verification of
Contractor Records have the same objective, but there are significant
differences in these procedures. We have seen that Contractor Decision
Verification procedures make use of the concepts of a p-chart and that
the maximum allowable fraction defective of the sample varies with the
sample size. This is not true with procedures for Verification of
Contractor's Records, which do not make use of control charts nor vary
the maximum allowable fraction defective with sample size.
In accomplishing Verification of Contractor Records, a sample of
unspecified size is taken from the contractor's inspection decisions.
Regardless of the sample size, the contractor's process is considered
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unacceptable if the fraction defective of the sample exceeds 2.8%.
Using these procedures, the individual contract administrator has
considerable flexibility in selecting a sample size commensurate with
the volume of inspection decisions available instead of being re-
stricted to samples of 50, 100, or 250 as in Contractor Decision Veri-
fication procedures.
This section has briefly discussed how sample results may be used
in making the decision to accept or reject the contractor's process,
but it has not given the manager any guidance for application of
decision verification procedures. The next section will discuss one
tool the contract adndnistration manager can use in deciding whether
or not a modified decision verification procedure could be productively
included in his quality assurance program, even if any requirement to
accomplish decision verification had been waived because of lack of
adequate production volume.
B. OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC CURVES
FOR DECISION VERIFICATION
In determining the applicability and feasibility of decision veri-
fication in his particular situation, a manager should consider a
number of factors. These include practical sample size, frequency of
sampling, cost of inspection versus cost of material rejected further
along in the process, and other inspections, such as product verifica-
tion inspection, which may reduce the need for decision verification.
An operating characteristic curve is one device available to the
manager as an aid in determining the potential value of decision
verification procedures in his overall quality assurance program. The
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operating characteristic curve shows how the probability of acceptance
varies with the quality of decision.
Figure 1 shows operating characteristic curves for p-charts which
could be used in Contractor Decision Verification Procedures. Three
of these curves, namely 50, 100, and 250 are those which should be used
when doing verification as specified by the directive. Each curve is
plotted for a different sample size. The probability of the results of
the verification procedure being considered acceptable for a sample of
size (n) is plotted against the process fraction defective.
Turning to Figure 1 it can be seen that for any particular value of
process fraction defective, with an AQL of 0.01, a sample size of 25
gives less probability of detecting an out of control process than a
sample size of 50. The manager can use the operating characteristic
curves to determine how much better chance of detecting a shift in the
process exists when the sample is 50 instead of 25. Doubling the sample
size generally does not double the probability of detecting a process
shift. The manager should compare the value of an added increment of
protection against undetected process shifts to the cost of getting that
additional protection.
Continuing with Figure 1, if the actual fraction defective of the
process shifts to 5%, there is about a 0.14 probability that this shift
in the process will be detected if a sample of 25 is taken. Doubling
For a detailed discussion of operating characteristic curves, see
Quality Control and Industrial Statistics by A. J. Duncan. Chapter 7
and Chapter 19 of this text are of particular value in understanding





n = sample size
n=25
n=50
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1
Process Fraction Defective
Figure 1. Operating characteristic curves for single limit p-charts
for Contractor Decision Verification.
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the sample size to 50, gives a 0.24 probability that the process shift
will be detected. If these same sample sizes are used to verify the
process at 11 day intervals as specified in procedures for Contractor
Decision Verification, it is possible to calculate that there is an
approximate 0.60 probability that the shift will still be undetected
after about 30 days if the sample size is 25. This probability drops
to approximately 0.40 if the sample size is 50. Since the samples are
random, the probability of not detecting a shift after a given number
of samples is the product of the individual sample probabilities of
not detecting the shift.
Figure 2 shows operating characteristics curves for sample inspec-
tion plans which demonstrate the performance of the Verification of
Contractor Records procedures where the sample size is arbitrary.
Curves for various sample sizes are shown. It can readily be seen
again that the sample size affects the probability of accepting the
contractor's inspection process for any particular process fraction
defective
.
The manager can use these curves in much the same way as he could
use those in Figure 1. From the various curves he can determine how
the probability of accepting the contractor's process varies with
sample size.
It is interesting to compare some operating characteristic curves
for Contractor Decision Verification and those developed here for use
in Verification of Contractor Records. Figure 3 shows some operating
characteristic curves for Contractor Decision Verification and for
Verification of Contractor Records for the same sample sizes. It can
easily be seen that when both approaches use the same sampling size,
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Figure 3. Comparison of some operating characteristic curves for




Verification of Contractor Records procedures give a greater probability
of rejecting the contractor's process for unacceptable process fraction
defectives. This is true up to a sample size of 250 at which point the
operating characteristic curves for Contractor Decision Verification
and for Verification of Contractor Records are identical. This means
that for samples of less than 250 observations, the decision verification
procedures used by activities under the Naval Sea Systems Command perform
the decision verification function with greater statistical effectiveness
than procedures specified by Naval Air Systems Command.
In spite of the fact that either of the decision verification pro-
cedures discussed in this paper can be useful in a quality assurance
program neither of them was found to be extensively used. The next
section discusses some possible reasons for this non-use.
C. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OBSTRUCTING THE
USE OF DECISION VERIFICATION
Decision verification procedures were developed to aid the Government
in measuring the effectiveness of a contractor's quality assurance pro-
gram. In practice these procedures have evidently not produced the
desired results. They have been criticized and even deleted from some
quality assurance manuals.
People are the focus of many problems associated with decision veri-
fication. In many cases there are not enough quality assurance personnel
to do all of the assigned tasks, including decision verification. If
enough confidence can be generated in decision verification, a manage-
ment decision might result in more time spent on this type of inspection.
Quite the contrary appears to be happening today.
The value and the feasibility of decision verification procedures
is being seriously questioned by the users of these procedures and by
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various study panels on procurement. There is some merit to the argu-
ments against decision verification. For example, looking at the
operating characteristic curve in Figure 1 for a sample size of 250,
one sees that a process fraction defective three times as large as the
Acceptable Quality Level has approximately a 50% chance of being
accepted. It is little wonder that some people have lost confidence
in decision verification. On the other hand decision verification in
some cases may offer all the assurance of inspection quality necessary.
For example, using the same sample size of 250, if a manager is willing
to accept some probability that the fraction defective can be as much
as but not exceed a fraction defective of 0.06, he may confidently use
decision verification procedures, since the operating characteristic
curve shows that for a sample of 250, the probability is almost zero
of accepting decision processes which have fractions defective of 0.06
or greater.
There is some concern about the motivation of quality assurance
personnel to do accurate decision verification. Several experienced
Government supervisory personnel with whom this was discussed felt
that the quality assurance representative was often reluctant to per-
form decision verification because he had to judge the performance of
personnel rather than performance of a manufacturing process. This
problem could be especially acute in plants where Government quality
assurance personnel have had long association with the contractor's
inspectors
.
If a quality assurance representative is less than conscientious
he can easily falsify his records of decision verification performance.
The DD 1711 form used to record verification lists the stations veri-
fied, but specific hardware items inspected are not identified unless
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a defective observation is made. The audit trail for decision verifi-
cation is inadequate. Thus we see that attempts to accomplish decision
verification may well have to overcome several obstacles, not the least
of which is in some cases the possible lack of motivated and energetic
quality assurance representatives.
This chapter has discussed the idea of control charts used in veri-
fication, and has noted differences in two Navy decision verification
procedures. The value of operating characteristic curves to the
manager has been illustrated. The final chapter of this paper will
present conclusions and recommendations arising from this research.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several conclusions have been reached as a result of this investi-
gation into decision verification procedures used by various contract
administration offices. These can be conveniently grouped for dis-
cussion into general and specific categories.
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Some method of assessing the effectiveness of a contractor's inspec-
tion decisions would be useful in the overall Government quality
assurance program, but it is not an essential element. The objectives
of the Government's quality program can be, and most often are, met
without recourse to decision verification. There is little emphasis on
decision verification in the performance of many Navy contracts.
Although statistically sound, decision verification has been sub-
jected to some analysis in the past [Ref. 14]. It is, however, the
practical problems associated with accomplishing decision verification
rather than anything else which have caused decision verification to
be neglected.
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
Quality assurance directives issued by Naval Air Systems Command
and Naval Sea Systems Command for use by field contract administration
activities do not explain decision verification in sufficient statisti-
cal and probabilistic detail. They do not give the manager enough
information about decision verification procedures to enable him to
make a sound decision on whether to use these procedures as prescribed;
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to modify them to accommodate local conditions; or not to use decision
verification at all.
Some activities do not use decision verification procedures con-
tinuously because there is not enough production volume to support con-
tinuous verification. Instead, they only include decision verification
in the quality assurance audit program. Product Control Centers may
be audited for 10 day periods at approximately six-month intervals.
Audits can produce little useful information as far as decision
verification is concerned. As an example of this, if 40 observations
a day are made for two weeks, during the audit there is about a 30%
probability that the contractor's process would be accepted as in
control even if the process fraction defective were 3% instead of the
Acceptable Quality Level value of 1%. If low production volume was
the initial cause for doing decision verification only on an audit
basis, it is doubtful that even as many as 40 observations per day
would be available. Smaller samples than 40 observations would give
an even greater probability that the process was in control when it
actually was not.
People are definitely a critical element in the practical appli-
cation of decision verification. Both quality and quantity impact
on whether or not decision verification will be successful. The
quality assurance representatives must actually perform the verifica-
tion, and the supervisors and managers must have confidence in the
results. This investigation suggests that in some cases neither event
occurs, because results of decision verification as currently recorded




Because of problems encountered in performing decision verification
and lack of confidence in the results, there seems to be mixed interest
among quality assurance personnel in continuing to use decision verifi-
cation in a quality assurance program. Perhaps the usefulness and re-
quirement for decision verification should be reviewed by the material
commands of the Navy and a determination made as to whether or not this
decision verification should be retained as an element of Navy quality
assurance.
Further research is needed to determine the optimum mix of the
various elements of quality assurance such as product verification,
procedures evaluation, and decision verification. The possibility of
developing a more flexible procedure for use by the manager in applying
decision verification should be investigated. This method might include
such variables as volume of production, number of personnel available,
value of the product, and best location of various Product Control
Centers in the production flow.
There are some recommendations of a more immediate nature. For in-
stance, activities which now accomplish decision verification only on
an audit basis might consider discontinuing this practice. Because
of the infrequent sampling, the information obtained about the status
of the contractor's inspection decision process does not appear to be
worth the full time effort of a quality assurance representative during
the period of the audit.
It is also suggested that decision verification procedures be
standardized throughout the Navy if they are retained as part of the
Navy quality assurance program.
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. Finally it is proposed that managers at the local plant level
have their people develop operating characteristic curves such as
those in this paper. These curves can then be used in determining
the value of doing verification using various sample sizes and
sampling frequencies which are feasible at the individual production
activity. The local manager should decide whether or not he can
effectively use decision verification procedures.
The principal usefulness of this work is in bringing into focus
the issues to consider and assess concerning the viability of decision
verification processes at a given plant.
In this thesis we have discussed some methods of accomplishing
decision verification as related to quality assurance. We have also
looked at some of the problems which contract administrators face when
trying to accomplish decision verification under conditions which are
not favorable to using this quality assurance technique.
It is hoped that this thesis effort will be useful to those con-
tract administrators who wish to include decision verification as an
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